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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN FRANK PACE, and MILTON 
E. HANSEN, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendants John Frank Pace and Milton E. Hansen 
appeal their conviction for the crimes of burglary in the 
second degree and grand larceny. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendants were convicted by a jury of the crimes 
of burglary in the second degree and grand larceny in 
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. Defendants were sentenced to 
serve an indeterminate term as provided by law. 
Case No. 
13606 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the conviction of 
the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Upon entering the Intermountain Farmer's Associa-
tion building at 1800 South West Temple, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on or about the 14th day of March, 1973, Frank 
John Pace and Milton Edgar Hansen stole property in 
excess of fifty dollars from said Association. These ac-
tions were in violation of Title 76, Chapter 9, Sec. 3 and 
Title 76, Chapter 38, Sees. 1 and 4, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953). 
Entrance was accomplished by forcing open the large 
double doors on the south side of the building (T. 98-99). 
Once inside of the building a glass door leading to the 
office was broken and an unsuccessful attempt to open 
the office safe had been made (T. 46-47). Investigating 
officers also found several damp footprints in the office 
and warehouse section of the building in addition to 
tracks leading through the snow from a broken window 
to the fence encircling the immediate area (T. 44). Both 
appellants were arrested by police officers within this 
fenced area near the southwest corner of the yeard (T. 
43-44). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED 
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DEFENDANT HANSEN'S MOTION FOR 
SEVERANCE, THERE BEING NO INDICA-
TION THAT EITHER APPELLANT WOULD 
BE UNDULY PREJUDICED BY THE DE-
NIAL. 
Contrary to appellants' statement, this Court has 
set forth the criteria that must be met in order to obtain 
a severance pursuant to Section 77-31-6, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953). This standard was enunciated in the case of 
State v. Miller, 111 Utah 255, 177 P. 2d 727 (1947), and 
reaffirmed subsequently in State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 
2d 95, 355 P. 2d 689, cert, den., 368 U. S. 922, 76 Ed. 2d 
137, 82 S. Ct. 246 (1960); State v. Faulkner, 23 Utah 2d 
257, 461 P. 2d 470 (1969); State v. Langley, 25 Utah 2d 
24, 474 P. 2d 737 (1970); and requires that there be a 
showing of prejudice or unfairness as a result of the trial 
court's denial of said motion. See State v. Miller, supra, 
at 728 and State v. Langley, supra, at 31. Respondent 
asserts that the trial transcript does not contain the re-
quired prejudice or unfairness. At the time the motion 
was made by defense counsel on behalf of defendant Han-
sen, it was alleged that severance was necessary because 
of certain statements made by co-defendant Pace which, 
if introduced at trial, would severely prejudice defendant 
Hansen. At this point, attorney for the State of Utah 
Herschel Bullen stated that no such statement would be 
introduced in the course of the presentation of the State's 
case (T. 3). The trial court then correctly determined 
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that Mr. Hansen would not be prejudiced and correctly 
denied the motion (T. 4). 
A further examination of the record fails to reveal 
any of the prejudicial unfairness which would warrant 
reversal by this court. In appellant Hansen's own brief 
the only prejudice presented takes the form of self-serv-
ing hypotheticals. 
There being no evidence or showing of prejudice, the 
trial court correctly denied appellants' motion for sever-
ance. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOW-
ING THE JURY TO HEAR AND CONSIDER 
TESTIMONY WHICH WAS ADMISSIBLE. 
A. THE TESTIMONY WAS NOT EVI-
DENCE OF ANOTHER CRIME. 
An examination of the transcript of Trial (T. I l l ) 
reveals that a lock pick was discovered on the person of 
Mr. Milton Hansen by the investigating officer. As a 
witness, this officer, reading from his police report, de-
tailed the various items found in the possession of appel-
lant and, upon the request of the court, the witness spelled 
out the word, lock pick. Subsequently, the witness was 
asked by Mr. Bullen, prosecuting attorney, to describe 
and explain the uses of a lock pick (T. 111). Such testi-
mony was considered admissible by the trial court (T. 
112) and this testimony does not constitute reversible 
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error whether or not counsel presented correct grounds 
for an objection at trial. 
Unfortunately, from the obscure language used to 
construct appellants' own self-serving interpretation on 
this testimony it, at least, becomes clear that appellants 
seriously misread State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P. 
2d 512 (1968). In Poe, grisly colored slides of the de-
ceased in a trial charging first degree murder were ad-
mitted into evidence. The case was reversed and re-
manded. Because, in the court's words ". . . The slides 
could very well have tipped the scales in favor of the 
death penalty . . . and because of the other doubtful as-
pects of the trial . . ." Poe says nothing about the inad-
missibility of the kind of testimony involved in the in-
stant case. 
Similarly, appellants' attempt to create a conclusion-
any inference from the testimony offered at trial shows 
an inaccurate citation of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-205 
(1953); which section deals with the elements of criminal 
homicide that are of course, not at issue. Even if Section 
76-9-8, dealing with the possession of burglarious tools 
were cited by appellants, the thrust of such an argument 
would be inappropriate since the prosecution made no 
indication, either articulated or implied, that the testi-
mony concerned with the pick lock involved a charge 
pursuant to Section 76-9-8. 
State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 P. 1071 (1915), 
articulating the standard, states: 
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"Under our jurisprudence men may be tried 
only for the specific crime with which they stand 
charged. All other crimes . . . which the accused 
may have committed or contemplated are irrele-
vant and may not be shown against him." 
This well-settled law was not violated in appellants' trial, 
as is clearly shown in the transcript of the proceedings. 
Appellants were not charged with any violation of Sec-
tion 76-9-8 and the testimony concerning the lock pick 
was admissible in that such a device is commonly used 
in the furtherance of the crimes of burglary in the second 
degree and grand larceny that appellants were charged 
with. In State v. Cox, 74 Utah 149, 277 P. 972 (1929), 
the evidence therein established that defendant had made 
sales of wheat at approximately the same time that wheat 
had been stolen was held to have been erroneously ad-
mitted but was not a reversible error. Consequently, 
appellants' argument for reversal inadequately based on 
the authority of either Anselmo or Cox. 
Further, the citations of State v. Johnson, 25 Utah 
2d 160, 478 P. 2d 491 (1970), and State v. Dickenson, 12 
Utah 2d 8, 361 P. 2d 412 (1961), cited by appellants, are 
superfluous since appellants have failed to establish that 
the testimony relevant to the lock pick was designed to 
"disgrace" the defendant as a person of evil character 
with the propensity to commit crime" (Brief of Appellant, 
p. 7). In Johnson, supra, admission of policeman's testi-
mony was held not to be prejudicial error because it was 
offered, similar to the testimony concerning the lock pick 
in the instant as an integral part of evidence relevant to 
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the charge on which defendant was being tried. Conson-
ant with the holding of Dickenson, supra, that evidence 
concerning other crimes is not admissible to disgrace de-
fendant or "primarily for the purpose of creating in the 
minds of the jurors the impression that the defendant 
had a propensity to commit crime . . . ," (Brief of Ap-
pellant at p. 7), the trial court in the present case did not 
allow the testimony to disgrace the defendant. Since 
appellants neither show that the testimony is irrelevant 
to the charged crimes nor that the testimony presented 
was an endeavor to disparage appellants, appellants' ar-
gument on these grounds is without merit. 
B. THE TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE 
POSSESSION OF CERTAIN TOOLS BY 
APPELLANT WAS NOT INFLAMMA-
TORY SINCE THEY WERE MATERIAL 
TO THE CRIME CHARGED. 
In the Transcript of Trial (T. 39), the witness states 
that: 
"As we approached the office area I could see 
that the glass was broken in the door. The door 
is taped with a steel tape. It's a burglar alarm 
that I have seen previously when I have been 
there." 
In addition, the Transcript of Trial (T. 98, 99) indicates 
that a door to the building had been forced open. In both 
instances the glass cutter and the lock pick may have 
been used in the furtherance of the charged crimes. From 
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the evidence available one cannot be certain that the tools 
mentioned were actually utilized. However, from this it 
may be reasonably conjectured that the tools were not 
in fact used in the effort to enter the building and that 
entry was made ". . . by breaking out a window and by 
kicking down doors" (App. Brief at p. 8). 
Appellants' citation of State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 
350 P. 2d 756 (1960); People v. Flanagan, 65 Cal. App. 2d 
371, 150 P. 2d 927 (1944); and People v. Howard, 10 Cal. 
App. 2d 258, 52 P. 2d 283 (1935),only serves to further 
confuse the issues involved. Rather than showing that 
the lock pick or the glass cutter were not an integral part 
of the res gestae of the charged crimes (see Jones, On 
Evidence, Vol. 2, Sec. 318-320), hence inadmissible, the 
sitation of Little, supra, only shows a confusion of the 
critical distinction between the acceptable parameters 
of a witness's testimony and the permissible limits for 
exhibits used as evidence. The Court in Little, supra, 
held that the introduction of a blackjack and bicycle 
sprocket chain fashioned into a blackjack taken from de-
fendant's automobile were inadmissible since their pres-
ence in the automobile were " . . . irrelevant to any proper 
issue and served in no way to explain the circumstances 
of the crimes." The holding in Howard is in accord with 
the Court in Little. Indeed, the Court in Planagan, supra, 
articulates acceptable boundaries within which the trial 
court in the instant case operated. 
"Tools and instruments of crime found in the 
possession or under the control of defendant soon 
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after the commission of the offense may be of-
fered in evidence whenver they constitute a link 
in the chain of circumstances which tend to 
connect him with the commission of the offense 
charged." 
Both State v. Filacchione, 136 Mont. 238, 347 P. 2d 
1000 (1960), and State v. Crawford, 60 Utah 6, 206 P. 
717 (1922), fail to duplicate the factual conditions ob-
taining in the instant case; consequently, the points of 
law contained therein are inapplicable. In the former 
case the Court did allow those tools into evidence, ". . . 
since they were in defendant's possession when found," 
and in the latter, the .32 and .38 caliber cartridges were 
not admitted given that the weapon used in the course 
of the robbery was a .45 Colt revolver. Moreover, the 
general position of the Court in Anselmo, supra, men-
tioned above is in no way threatened by the procedure 
of the trial court in admitting the testimony concerning 
the lock pick and the glass cutter. The charge that the 
testimony concerning the lock pick and glass cutter was 
inflammatory is simply not sustained on the authority 
of these cited cases. 
Since there is a clear distinction between the admissi-
bility of evidence in the form of exhibits and the admissi-
bility of testimony of a witness, the analogy forged by 
the appellants between the hunting knife as Exhibit 17 
(T. 164) and the testimony of the witness cxmcerning 
the lock pick and glass cutter is spurious. Given the 
inappropriate character of this analogy, the inference of 
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prejudicial error is unwarranted as is the citation of 
State v. Lewis, 8 Utah 2d 224, 332 P. 2d 664 (1958). 
POINT III. 
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT DE-
FENDANT HANSEN'S MOTION TO DIS-
MISS THE GRAND LARCENY COUNT AT 
THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE WAS 
NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR AS TO BOTH 
THE BURGLARY AND THE GRAND LAR-
CENY COUNTS. 
A. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
TO ALLOW THE GRAND LARCENY 
COUNT TO GO TO THE JURY. 
Contrary to the suggestion of appellants, the trial 
court acted lawfully when a motion to dismiss the grand 
larceny charge was denied. On the basis of selections 
from the Transcript of Trial appellants seek to show that 
the theft of the saddles upon which action the grand 
larceny charge was predicated did not take place. Such 
a suggestion is based upon the content of the testimony 
of a witness, Mr. Lewis, who supposedly ". . . did not 
then or at any time testify that three saddles or any 
saddles were missing," (Brief of App. at p. 12). 
Such a suggestion might only be made if a willful dis-
tortion is made of specific statements as well as the com-
monplace meaning normally derived from the general 
comments made throughout the trial concerning the dis-
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appearance of the saddles. An example of such an egregi-
ous distortion of a specific statement is found in appel-
lants statement that, "At one point, the witness Lewis 
testified that there was a knife lying on a bag of feed 
next to the saddles (emphasis) on the 14th day of March, 
1973" (App. Brief at p. 13). However, an examination 
of the Transcript of Trial (T. 124) discloses that Mr. 
Lewis corrected himself as he says, "Also I noticed an-
other box — it was the same type of box — laying over 
on a bag of feed right next to the saddles, saddle tree." 
It is apparent from this utterance alone that Mr. Lewis 
was referring to the "saddle tree" rather than the saddles. 
From the context of the transcript pertaining to the 
saddles, it is readily apparent that not only did the prose-
cution understand the saddles to be missing but also the 
defense as well as the court. The discussion concerning 
the value of the missing saddles, especially the voir dire 
examination by appellants' counsel is based on the un-
contested belief that the saddles had been stolen (T. 131-
132). During the entire course of this discussion objec-
tion questions this belief was not raised by appellants' 
counsel, Mr. Hill, and there was no objection raised by 
Mr. Hill when a definite statement concerning the num-
ber of saddles missing was indicated (T. 123). 
"Q. Okay. Did you notice those saddles 
there on the 13th? 
A. Yes, they were there. They were on the 
saddle tree, just for saddles. 
Q. Four saddles there on the 13th? 
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A. Yes." 
After a sustained effort by appellants' counsel to 
prevent the witness from stating the value of the missing 
saddles (T. 125-133), the witness finally clearly states: 
"A. The saddles were always in the two 
hundred dollar range, very close to two hundred 
dollars in value (T. 133). 
The Court: Overruled. I don't know what 
your two hundred dollars refers to. One of them, 
two of them, or three of them. 
The Witness: Two hundred dollars each." 
According to the testimony of the witness, Mr. Lewis, 
the saddles had been taken from the immediate area of 
the building; the recovery of those saddles was not effected 
in order to mark them for identification purposes. Need-
less to say, it is not uncommon for stolen items to escape 
recovery by authorities. Because the witness also ob-
served depressed and disturbed snow on both sides of 
the fence, he reasoned that the saddles were thrown over 
the fence in order to be taken away from the area (T. 
155). To complain that appellants were disadvantaged 
by virtue of the fact that an alternative witness could not 
be called to appraise the saddles which were unavailable 
as exhibits is to raise a moot complaint. 
Therefore, on the strength of the evidence submitted 
at trial the grand larceny conviction should be affirmed. 
B. THE SUBMISSION OF THE GRAND 
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LARCENY COUNT TO THE JURY WAS 
NOT IMPROPER AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
In the court's comment to the jury it is made clear 
that the evidence tendered by the State was circumstan-
tial evidence (T. 219). 
"The Court: This is drcumstantial evi-
dence. Nobody saw the saddles go out. And 
you may consider all the evidence surrounding 
the event, that they were there the day before 
and they weren't there the next morning . . . " 
Unfortunately, the citation of State v. Potello, 40 Utah 
56, 68,119 P. 1023,1028 (1911), neither helps to establish 
the correct grounds upon which the jury based its verdict 
nor does it show that the grand larceny conviction of 
appellants was an unlawful inference on an inference. 
Obviously, an interview with the jurors would be neces-
sary to establish the reasons for their decision, neither 
conjectures nor case citation will establish this. 
Whale Potello, supra, does indeed reiterate the un-
contested rule of law that "one presumption or inference 
cannot rest upon another mere inference or presumption 
. . . (But) . . . can only rest on proven facts;" the details 
of this case make impossible the application of this rule 
to the instant case. In Potello, no evidence was submitted 
to show that the defendant took the horse from the own-
er's corral. Since there existed another very plausible 
hypothesis to explain the disappearance of the horse, viz., 
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that the horse strayed out of the corral, the lack of evi-
dence was in light of the "recent possession" statute 
(Comp. Law 1907, Sec. 4355) was insufficient to warrant 
a conviction. 
But appellants' case does not illustrate a violation 
of this rule of law endorsed by the court in Potello pri-
marily because a plausible hypothesis as an alternate 
explanation was not offered. Horses may stray from the 
confines of their corrals but saddles commonly remain 
stationary until moved by another. Consequently, be-
cause appellants' argument is based on a tenuous con-
struction of the jury's method of decision-making and 
because the cited case of Potello, supra, is factually irrele-
van to appellants' case, the conviction of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
POINT IV. 
THERE EXISTED NO JURY MISCON-
DUCT WHICH DEPRIVED APPELLANTS 
OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
TRIAL BY JURY. 
A right to trial by jury is a guaranteed fundamental 
right by the United States Constitution and by Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. It is not guaran-
teed that jurors will, at all times, remain entirely alert. 
Despite any reference that one or two jurors had lapsed 
into a state of drowsiness on several occasions during the 
course of the trial (T. 96, 206-216), it is obvious that 
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this conduct would not breach the constitutional guar-
antee of a right to a trial by jury afforded appellants. 
Undeniably, a sleeping state may be thought to oblit-
erate immediate sense perceptions, but to imply, as appel-
lants do at page 18, that the entire jury could not hear 
the evidence because of the slumber of one or two is 
without merit. As a result, appellants' further implica-
tion, ipso facto, that their Constitutional rights were 
denied is equally without merit. 
The cited case of State v. Morgan, 23 Utah 212, 64 
P. 356 (1901), is used to suggest that the dozing of the 
jurors was prejudicial to appellants. However, Morgan, 
supra, raises the issue of the veracity at voir dire in that 
two jurors prior to trial had allegedly made statements 
to persons indicating bias against defendant. It is this 
kind of substantial issue which gives rise to that court's 
statement as quoted by Appellant at p. 19. Since the 
issue governing the court's statement concerning preju-
dice to a defendant turns on the crucial point of veracity 
at voir dire, the application of Morgan, supra, cannot be 
made to appellants' argument. 
As cited by appellants, the line of case represented 
by State v. Jones, 187 Kan. 496, 357 P. 2d 760 (1960); 
Hall v. State, 223 Md. 158, 162 A. 2d 751 (1960); State 
v. Mellor, 73 Utah 104, 272 P. 635 (1928), supports the 
proposition that dozing on the part of the jurors is not 
prejudicial to a defendant, hence is not considered jury 
misconduct of a magnitude to warrant a reversal. In 
Mellor, supra, for example, it was held that although a 
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juror had fallen asleep several times in the course of the 
trial, this fact did not require a new trial Moreover, the 
lanugage of Mellor, supra, makes it clear that any ques-
tions of a juror's misconduct is within the discretion of 
the trial court and is subject to review only upon a clear 
showing of an abuse of that discretion. Thus, in the ab-
sence of these conditions necessary for reversal, the con-
viction should be sustained. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS RE-
SPONSE TO THE JURY AFTER DELIB-
ERATIONS HAD BEGUN. 
A. AN INSPECTION OF THE RECORD 
FOR APPELLANTS' TRIAL SHOWS 
THAT INSTRUCTION NO. 5-C DEAL-
ING WITH THE DISTINCTION BE-
TWEEN CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND DI-
RECT EVIDENCE WAS SUBMITTED 
TO THE JURY IN WRITING PURSU-
ANT TO RULE 51, UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE (R. 261). IN AD-
DITION, WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS 
NO. 9 AND NO. 10 WERE GIVEN IN 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PORTION 
OF THIS RULE 51. 
"The court shall not comment on the evidence in 
the case, and if the court states any of the evi-
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denoe, it must instruct the jury that they are 
the exclusive judges of all questions of fact." 
In so doing, the court acted in accord with Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-31-1(5) which requires that, "when the evi-
dence is concluded the court must charge the jury as in 
civil actions." 
Although Instruction 4-C was given to the jury in 
writing, the Transcript of Trial shows that the jurors 
desired some clarification of this specific instruction (T. 
217). This jury request generated the oral response 
offered by the court as recorded on 218-219 of the Tran-
script of Trial. Such a response to an inquiry made by 
the jurors after the commencement of their deliberations 
is clearly covered by Rule 47 (N) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure: 
"After the jury have retired for deliberation, if 
there is a disagreement among them as to any 
part of the testimony, or if they desire to be 
informed on any point of law arising in the 
cause, they may require the officer to conduct 
them into court. Upon being brought into court 
the information required must be given in the 
presence of, or after notice to, the parties or 
counsel. Such information must be given in 
in writing or taken down by the reporter." 
Since the response of the court was noted by the court 
reporter, the requisite conditions of this rule were met. 
Thus, the cases cited as State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 507, 51 
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P. 2d 1052 (1935), and Kurtz v. Nelson, 94 Utah 185, 76 
P. 2d 577 (1938), are inappropriate. Given that the in-
structions given by the court were neither inconsistent 
or contradictory. The holding of State v. Waid, 92 Utah 
297, 67 P. 2d 647 (1937), is equally irrelevant to appel-
lant's argument. 
B. THE INSTRUCTION WAS A CORRECT 
STATEMENT OF THE LAW CONCERN-
ING THE USE OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
The holding of State v. Merritt, 67 Utah 325, 247 P. 
497 (1926), is essentially contained within the context 
of Instruotion No. 13 (R. 272), as provided by the court 
during appellants' trial. To warrant conviction under 
the holding of Merritt, supra, the circumstantial evidence 
must convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that 
all facts and circumstances are true and are incompatiible 
with any reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of 
the accused. 
Moreover, Instruction No. 14 states: 
"These instructions are to be considered alto-
gether as a whole, and not as if each instruction 
were a complete statement of the law by itself. 
And even though a rule, direction or thought is 
stated in different ways and repeated in more 
than one instruction you should not give it un-
due emphasis and ignore others. But you should 
consider all of the instructions as a whole and 
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apply them all to the evidence in light of all of 
the instructions" (R. 273). 
This instruction corresponds in all substantial matters 
to the holdings in sustaining similar instructions rendered 
in State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 131 P. 2d 805 (1942); 
State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P. 2d 285 (1941); and 
State v. Judd, 74 Utah 398, 279 P. 953 (1929). The court 
in Judd makes it clear that a court is not required to 
charge that every circumstance constituting a link in the 
chain of evidence must be consistent with defendant's 
guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. Rather, the 
overall circumstances are to be considered with other 
related facts so that the conclusion reached by the jury 
is founded on the entire fabric of evidence presented. It 
is this position which is endorsed by the courts in both 
Laub, supra, and Erwin, supra, and embodied in the in-
structions given by the court during appellants' trial. 
Owing to the difference in factual content and the 
proper instructions given by the court to the jury ger-
mane to circumstantial evidence, appellants' argument 
based on State v. Hutchings, 30 Utah 319, 84 P. 893 
(1906), as well as that based on State v. Burch, 100 Utah 
414, 115 P. 2d 911 (1941), are insufficiently grounded. 
The former case presents one with circumstantial evi-
dence of the most fragile sort, including the highly fanci-
ful suggestion of one witness that one hundred sixteen 
live chickens were quietly hidden under a few blankets 
in a buggy. Faced with this kind of transparent evidence, 
the court there laid down this general rule: 
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"Under the law it was incumbent upon the jury 
to acquit the defendant, if the evidence, relied 
upon, could be reconciled upon any reasonable 
hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the 
defendant. Especially is this rule applicable, 
where, as here it is sought to convict the accused 
wholly upon circumstantial evidence, and where 
the circumstances leave the mind in grave doubt 
as to the commission of the offense." 
Insofar as the factual circumstances and quantum of 
evidence of Burch, supra, is similar to Hutchings, supra, 
the gravity of doubt as to the commission of the charged 
offense in these two cases simply does not appear in the 
trial of the appellants. Because the cited cases are in-
applicable to appellants' argument and because the in-
structions given by the court were correct statements 
according to law, their conviction should stand. 
C. THE INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY 
WAS A PROPER COMMENT ON THE 
EVIDENCE AND DID NOT MISLEAD 
THE JURY. 
The question apparently presented by appellants 
goes to whether or not the court during appellants' trial 
imposed its interpretation of the evidence upon the jury. 
A careful review of the significant portions of the Tran-
script of Trial does not in any way point to a violation 
of Article 1, Sec. 12 of the Utah Constitution (See es-
pecially T. 218-221) as a comment on guilt or innocence. 
Rather than telling ". . . them the saddles had been 
taken," or, strongly inferring "that the defendants had 
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done the taking," (Brief of Appellants at p. 31), the 
court, solicitous of the jurors' inquiries, attempted to 
answer the questions as succinctly as possible. 
The cases of State v. Seymour, 49 Utah 285, 163 P. 
789 (1917); State v. Greene, 33 Utah 497, 94 P. 987 
(1908); State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P. 2d 177 (1931); 
and State v. Harris, 1 Utah 2d 182, 264 P. 284 (1953), 
support the appellants' contention that a trial court 
should not comment on the nature of the evidence to the 
extent that it encroaches upon the lawful duty of the 
jury to evaluate this evidence. The cases are, however, 
inappropriate to the instant as the court's comments did 
not go to guilt or innocence and therefore were not an 
unlawful elision of the jurors' proper function. 
The state of affairs in the Seymour case, supra, giv-
ing cause for the dicta recorded in the Brief of AppeUant 
at P. 27, is encapsulated in the following quotation: 
"Quote apart from the fact that at least one, 
and possibly two, of the representations set forth 
in the information did not relate to an existing 
fact, or to existing facts, the charge is faulty." 
Hence, the presence of counter factuals in the jury in-
structions obviated the charge to the jury. Similarly, the 
court in Harris, supra, committed a prejudicial error by 
obviously stating an evaluation of the evidence which 
was also done in Green, supra, and limiting jury's delib-
erations to whether the record of prior conviction was 
authentic. This was not the case during appellant's trial. 
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Because the Transcript of Trial clearly establishes in 
the instant that the court, during appellants' trial, did 
not introduce the jury to material facte not admitted ait 
trial, the citation of Green, supra, becomes an enipty 
exercise. 
CONCLUSION 
From a consideration of these data, the judgment; 
of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
M. REID RUSSELL 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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